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Introduction
On March 15, 2013, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo confirmed that Japan would
participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. The TPP
negotiations are in two forms, international and domestic. On the one hand, a
Japanese governmental representative negotiates for an agreement with other TPP
participating countries such as the United States internationally. On the other
hand, he simultaneously negotiates for ratification of a domestic constituency
domestically.
In this paper, we examine the international and domestic negotiations through
a two-level game analysis,
1
that is, an analytical framework of international
political economy. Trade negotiations generally consist of the strategic processes
that a government representative uses to influence a negotiating partner country or
a domestic constituency while negotiating with them. The international
negotiations with other countries are called “level one” negotiations (international
politics), while the domestic negotiations with the domestic constituencies are
called “level two” negotiations (domestic politics).
International TPP negotiations decide the payoff distribution between
countries. The Japanese governmental representative negotiates tariff abolitions
and the market opening with other TPP participating countries. A TPP is
negotiated on the principle of “tariff abolitions without exception,” and includes
five important categories of agricultural products. The negotiations focus on the
type of agreement Japan can enter into for tariff abolition and market openings
with other TPP participating countries, as well as on how Japan can extend
concessions to them. The Japanese payoff distributions with other TPP
participating countries are decided by agreement.
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The Japanese domestic payoff distributions are decided by domestic TPP
negotiations. Tariff abolitions may lead to major changes in the payoff
distributions between the domestic industrial and agricultural sectors. There are
strong objections against the tariff abolitions of agricultural products from the
domestic constituencies, such as the domestic agriculture groups, agricultural
bureaucrats, and Nosui-Zoku Diet members, whose payoff distributions would
become disadvantageous. There is a need for domestic reforms (agricultural
administration reforms) that affect the domestic constituencies so that the
governmental representative can get the domestic negotiations ratified.
The international and domestic TPP negotiations are mutually related. Japan
must raise its tariff abolition rate for agricultural products to make an agreement
with the United States through international negotiations. However, the
governmental representative cannot get the ratification of the domestic
constituencies, such as the agricultural stakeholders, if the country’ s tariff
abolition rate is raised. On the other hand, an international agreement will
become difficult if he lowers the rate of tariff abolition to suit a domestic
constituency. For the domestic ratification of an international agreement at a high
rate of tariff abolition, the government representative will have to give side
payments (income compensation) through domestic reforms (agricultural
administration reforms) to the domestic constituencies that incur losses.
This paper is organized as followed. In section I, we first examine the
international TPP negotiations and then explore the background of the
negotiations, the American strategies, Japanese participation, and the field of TPP
negotiations. In section II, we examine the domestic reforms in Japan and
explore the effects of a TPP on the country’s domestic agriculture, the trade
liberalization negotiations, and the agricultural administration reforms from price
supporting to direct payments (income compensation).
I: International Negotiations in TPP
In this section, we examine the international TPP negotiations. We first
examine the background of the TPP negotiations that started in March 2010 and
the American strategies to gain the leadership of the negotiations. We then
explore the Japanese participation and the Japan-U.S. prior consultation and
clarify the range of negotiation issues and the Japanese interest fields.
1. Background of TPP and American Strategies
The background of TPP. TPP is a free trade agreement for the purpose of
tariff abolition and market opening in the Asia-Pacific Rim region. The countries
participating in TPP negotiations aim for the abolition of border enforcement and
the relaxation of domestic regulations to promote the liberalization of trade and
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investment of goods and services.
2
Regarding tariffs abolition, the countries aim
for the abolition of tariffs for “substantially all” goods and services, including the
sensitive items. Presently, TPP negotiations are one of the most important trade
negotiations in the world.
At present, 12 countries participate in TPP negotiations. The total GDP of
these 12 countries is about 40% of the world GDP and their total trade occupies
about 25% of the world trade of goods and services.
3
The original TPP
negotiations were started by Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile in 2002, with
Brunei joining subsequently. In May 2006, the Pacific 4 (P4) Agreement
between these four countries came into effect.
4
In March 2010, the United States,
Australia, Peru, and Vietnam joined the four P4 countries, and the current TPP
negotiations started with these eight countries. Malaysia, Canada, and Mexico
joined the negotiations later, and Japan’s participation was approved in April
2013. Since July 2013, the negotiations take place with these 12 countries (see
TABLE 1).
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TABLE 1. International Negotiations and Domestic Reforms in TPP
Date International negotiations Domestic reforms
1993. Dec. GATT Uruguay Round agri-agreement
1995. Nov. Food Control Law
2000. Mar. Food, Agriculture, and Rural Areas Basic
Plan 1
2001. Jan. Japanese FTA/EPA negotiations start
2001. Oct. Management Policy for Structural
Agriculture Reforms
2002 TPP original talks start
2003. Oct. Doha Round, the U.S. & EU agri-agreement
2005. Mar. Food, Agriculture, and Rural Areas Basic
Plan 2
2006. May Pacific 4 Agreement
2007. Apr. Management stability measures
2010. Mar. TPP talks by eight countries start
2010. Apr. Individual (household) income support
2012. Dec. Abe Administration of Liberal Democratic
Party
2013. Feb. The Japan―U.S. joint statement
2013. Mar. Japan’s expression to participate in TPP
2013. Apr. The Japan―U.S. prior consultation agreed
2013. Jul. Japan’s participation in TPP talks
2013. Nov. Abolition of production adjustment decided
American Strategies. The American strategies for gaining leadership of the
TPP negotiations include three points: 1) profits of the American industries, 2)
construction of multilateral trade rules among many countries, and 3) regional
security in the Asia-Pacific Rim countries.
5
First, the United States has economic strategies to expand its exports to the
Asian region―this has grown rapidly―and to increase its employment level after
the world financial crisis.
6
TPP has the particular task of supporting the profits of
American multinational enterprises. The American automobile industry demands
that the American tariffs be maintained and that the Japanese auto markets be
opened up. In addition, the American insurance industry looks for increased
profits in the Japanese market. In Japan, American insurance companies (Aflac
and MetLife Alico) occupy 70% of the cancer insurance and 30% of medical
insurance markets.
Second, the United States proposes to introduce the next-generation
multilateral trade rules among many countries.
7
Several countries do not have a
common rule with regard to environment, labor, investment, government
procurement, technical standards, and so on. The struggle for power in rule
making is severe, and the country that gets the support of the various countries
first and makes an effective rule among them will gain a global standard. The
American strategies include gaining the support of exclusive countries such as
Vietnam, promoting Chinese involvement, and then getting the Chinese market
opened up in the future.
Third, the American TPP strategy includes taking up the task of security in the
Asia-Pacific Rim region. TPP is important for America to oppose China’ s
strengthening influence on the political economy of this area. The United States
would cooperate with the Asia-Pacific countries against China’ s expansion
militarily and it expects a role for TPP as an economic security agreement that
does not depend on the Chinese market economically.
2. Japanese Participation and the Japan―U.S. Bilateral Consultation
Japanese Participation. The Japanese participation in TPP negotiations was
explored under the Democratic Party Administration and it came into effect under
the Liberal Democratic Party Administration. In November 2010, Prime Minister
Kan Naoto of the Democratic Party Administration expressed his intent to explore
Japanese participation in TPP negotiations. In November the next year, Prime
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Minister Noda Yoshihiko announced his intention to participate in TPP
negotiations with the concerned countries.
8
In the House of Representatives
election of December 2012, the campaign policy of the Liberal Democratic Party
objected to Japanese participation in TPP as far as it premised “tariff abolition
without any exception.” However, after the Liberal Democratic Party
overwhelmingly won the elections, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo who took charge
of the government showed an active interest in participating in TPP negotiations.
On February 22, 2013, the “Japan―U.S. Joint Statement” was announced in
the Abe-Obama summit meeting.
9
The two countries confirmed the following
points in their joint statement: 1) all trade goods are to become objects of
negotiations (the principle of TPP), 2) there would be no demand for tariff
abolition for sensitive trade items (demand of Japan), and 3) with regard to the
automobile industry and pending matters such as insurance, the two countries will
continue talks (demand of the United States; the start of the Japan―U.S. prior
consultation).
The joint statement affirmed certain exceptions in the negotiations. In the
background of the joint statement, there were political pressures from the interest
groups, such as agriculture, medical service, and party politicians, including the
Liberal Democratic Party of the ruling party, which objected to participating in
TPP negotiations with the slogan of “objection for tariff abolition without
exception.” The political pressures of such domestic TPP objection groups play an
important role in international negotiations. The Japanese government can forge
international agreements only if the TPP objection groups that have veto power
accept them.
After the Japan―U.S. joint statement, in March 2013, the Liberal Democratic
Party formed a TPP Task Force (Chairperson Nishikawa Koya) within the party.
The Task Force gave top priority to allowing a “sanctuary” such as for important
five agricultural categories and the system of public health insurance for the
whole nation, adopted the resolution that Japan should leave the TPP negotiation
if this is not allowed, and then approved the Japanese participation.
10
On March 1
the same year, some members of the opposition parties, such as the Democratic
Party, established a cartel to promote TPP negotiations and supported the
participation of Japan in TPP negotiations initiated by the government.
On March 15, 2013, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo formally announced the
country’s participation in TPP negotiations. It was judged that the environment
for participation was right from the fact that the TPP Task Force of the Liberal
Democratic Party approved Japanese participation and the former Japan―U.S.
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 36 / 2014 85
8. See Auslin (2012) and Naoi and Urata (2013) for Japanese participation and domestic
politics.
9. Joint Statement by the United States and Japan.
10. Liberal Democratic Party (2013), “TPP taisaku ni kansuru ketsugi.”
summit meeting confirmed the sanctuary for tariff abolition. In the Diet, in April
the same year, the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries committees of both houses
of Representatives and Councilors adopted the “Resolution for TPP Agreement
Negotiations Participation” and demanded giving top priority to defending the
sanctuary such as for five important agricultural categories.
11
The Japan―U.S. Bilateral Consultation. On April 12, 2013, the prior
consultation confirmed in the Japan―U.S. Joint Statement was settled. In the
consultation, it was decided that the “Japan―U.S. bilateral consultation” would
hold in the fields of automobile trade and nontariff barriers.
12
This bilateral
consultation is called “the entrance charges” that the United States imposes on
Japan for participating in TPP negotiations. The prior consultation confirmed
also that Japanese agricultural products and American automobiles were sensitive
items in Japan―U.S. trade.
First, in the field of automobiles, the two countries discussed the tariffs in the
United States, the automobile dealer systems in Japan, and the safety standards
and incentive systems in finance in Japan. The United States ascertained that 1)
the United States will maintain the tariffs (car 2.5% and truck 25%) for Japanese
automobiles for the time being, 2) the automobile dealer systems of the Japanese
automobile makers are import barriers for American exports, and 3) for Japanese
safety standards, the regulation is murky and an import barrier. The preferential
taxation system for light cars is unfair in the competition for American cars.
13
Second, in the field of nontariff barriers, the safety standards of foods and
insurance are matters for consultation. The United States noted that the Japanese
regulations on food additives and residual agricultural chemicals act as opaque
import barriers to American companies. Furthermore, the government
contribution for KAMPO life insurance is competitively unfair to American
companies. As a result, the Japanese government announced that it would freeze
the handling of new products as long as the government contribution for KAMPO
life insurance continued.
14
3. Range of Negotiation and Japanese Interests
The Range of TPP Negotiation. The range of TPP negotiations includes 21
issues (24 working groups), as shown in Table 2.
15
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The negotiating participants almost agreed on 17 issues and disagreed on four
issues, 1) commodity market access, 2) intellectual property, 3) competition
policy, and 4) environment, in the Cabinet meeting held in Singapore in
December 2013.
16
With respect to commodity market access, there was
opposition to the abolition of tariffs on Japanese agricultural products between
Japan and the United States. For intellectual property, there was difference of
opinion between the United States and the Malaysian-Vietnam combine on the
patent period of new medicines. With regard to competition policy, there was
opposition to the preferential treatment of state-owned companies between the
United States and the Malaysian-Vietnam combine. On environmental issues, the
United States demanded strict application of environmental standards for the
developing countries. The developing countries demanded moderate
environmental standards for promoting foreign investment and maintaining their
competitive power.
17
Japanese Interests. The Japanese interests in the TPP negotiations include
commodity market access (reduction of tariffs and nontariff barriers) and
multilateral trade rules. The tariff abolition of agricultural products in
Japan―especially for the five important categories, rice, sugar, dairy products,
beef/pork, and wheat―is a particularly important problem for the negotiation
because there is a deep conflict between Japan and the United States.
18
With
regard to multilateral trade rules such as intellectual property, competition policy,
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TABLE 2. Range of TPP Negotiations
Negotiation issues Assessment Negotiation issues Assessment
1. Commodity market access × 12. Financial service ○
2. Rules of origin ○ 13. Telecommunication service ◎
3. Trade harmonization ◎ 14. Electronic commerce ◎
4. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures ◎ 15. Dispute resolution ◎
5. Technical barriers to trade ◎ 16. Environment ×
6. Trade remedies ◎ 17. Labor ○
7. Government procurement ○ 18. Institutional matters ◎
8. Intellectual property × 19. Dispute resolution matters ◎
9. Competition policy × 20. Cooperation ◎
10. Cross-border service ○ 21. Cross-sectoral issues ◎
11. Commercial person immigration ○
Note: As of December 2013. ◎ Agreed, ○ Almost agreed, × Negotiating.
Source: Nihonkeizai Shinbun, November 26 and December 11, 2013.
and environment, Japan and the United States can cooperate in many fields.
The TPP participating countries demand that Japan increase its rate of tariff
abolition. The United State demands that the tariffs be abolished for all items,
including rice. TABLE 3 shows the Japanese tariff items and tariff abolition.
The total number of Japanese import tariff items is 9,018. Of these, Japan has so
far abolished the tariffs of 8,089 (89.8%) items. However, Japan has not been
able to abolish the tariffs of the remaining 929 items. The rate of tariff abolition
would be 93.5% (8,432 items) even if Japan abolished the tariffs of all items
except for the agricultural products of the important five categories (586 items:
6.5%) considered as sanctuary items. It is said that the participating countries
demand a tariff abolition rate of more than 95.9% (8,655 items).
Note that the participating countries will agree on a rate between the boundary
line of 93.5%for domestic ratification (Diet Resolution of April 2013) and the
boundary line of 95. 9%based on international request.
19
It would become
difficult for the government to persuade the domestic constituencies (agricultural
groups, Zoku Diet members, and bureaucrats) if they cannot defend the
agricultural products of the important five categories (rate of tariff abolition:
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TABLE 3. Tariff Abolition in Japan (Important Five Categories)
Source: Nihonkeizai Shinbun, September 5, 2013; Asahi Shinbun, October 11, 2013.
19. Asahi Shinbun, December 11, 2013.
93.5%), called sanctuary items, at all cost. On the other hand, the Japanese
government would need a tariff abolition rate of more than 95.9% to persuade the
United States and to conclude the TPP negotiations.
The Japanese government would be interested in opening up the overseas
markets of industrial products such as automobiles through tariff abolition.
Presently, the tariff rates of automobiles are as follows: the United States 2.5%,
Australia 5%, Canada 6.1%, New Zealand 10%, Malaysia 20%, and Vietnam
83%. The tariff rates for trucks are as follows: the United States 25%, Australia
5%, Malaysia 20%, and Vietnam 80%. The tariff expenditure that Japan incurs
for the TPP participation of 11 countries is about 4,700 hundred million yen a
year. Of this, the automobile industry pays half, and the industry’s payment to
the United States is about 800 hundred million yen a year.
20
II: Domestic Reforms in TPP
The TPP participating countries expect a high tariff abolition rate from Japan.
Domestic reforms (agricultural administration reform) are necessary in Japan to
meet this expectation. First, we will examine the influence of TPP on Japanese
agriculture. Thereafter, we will examine the trend of trade liberalization
negotiations and agricultural administration reforms after the GATT Uruguay
Round and clarify the transformation of agricultural administration policies from
price-supporting to direct-payment policies.
1. Impact of TPP on Japanese Agriculture
The TPP influences on Japanese economies are different by industry.
21
The
Japanese government announced the united estimation of the economic effects of
TPP in 2013. According to the Japanese estimation, the country’s GDP increased
by 320 thousand million yen (0. 66%) through the increased exports of
manufacturing industries, such as automobiles and electronic products. On the
other hand, the production value of agriculture, forestry, and marine products
decreased by 300 thousand million yen through the increased imports of these
products (see TABLE 4).
The decreased production of the five important categories (585 items) of
agricultural products was estimated to be 24,127 billion yen and to comprise more
than 80% of the total production decrease forecast. As for the production of rice,
the decrease was estimated to be worth 11,000 billion yen (32%). With respect
to sugar, the production decrease would amount to 1,720 billion yen and domestic
production would be completely destroyed. The production of wheat, meat, and
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dairy products too was expected to largely decrease. As for the production of
beef and pork, the decrease would be about 70%, according to the estimation, the
production of dairy products would be reduced by half, and wheat production
would almost be destroyed (a 99% decrease).
22
On account of this, the government aimed to exempt these five important
categories from tariff abolition in the TPP negotiations and introduce reforms in
domestic agricultural administration. The basic direction of the reforms would be
to improve agriculture through competition in the international market even if this
led to the abolishing of tariffs. Agricultural protection no longer amounts to the
uniform protection of farming through conventional tariffs, but has switched to
improving agriculture to promote competition and compensation income.
2. GATT and WTO Agricultural Agreements
The reforms of the Japanese agricultural administration are closely related to
the GATT and WTO agricultural agreements. The important points of the
agricultural agreements after the GATT Uruguay Round are, first, the tariffication
of nontariff barriers, and, second, the restraint of price supporting policies and
promotion of direct payment policies.
Agreements of the Uruguay Round. In December 1993, the agricultural
agreements within the GATT Uruguay Round were signed: they pertained to
border-related measures, domestic protection, and reduction in export subsidies.
23
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TABLE 4. Economic Impacts of TPP on Japanese Agriculture
Important five categories
Number of items
Tariff rate
(%)
Imports
(1,000t)
Domestic
production
(1,000t)
Farmers
(1,000
houses)
Production
(hundred
million yen)
Production
(%)
Rice 58 Rice
polished
778 869 8,474 1,445 −11,000 −32
Sugar Sugar 328 1,560 859 40 −1,500 −100
131 Amylum 583 136 250 36 −220 −100
Dairy 188 Dairy 218∼360 9 252 22 −2,900 −45
Beef & Beef 38.5 679 516 74 −3,600 −68
pork 100 Pork 4.3∼136 1,034 1,318 7 −4,600 −70
Wheat Wheat 252 5,354 674 86 −770 −99
109 Barley 256 2,084 168 35 −230 −79
Total − − − − −30,000 −
Note: Imports, domestic production, and farmers—fiscal year 2009.
Source: Cabinet Secretariat (2013) “(Beshi) Nourinsuisan-butsu heno eikyo-sisan no keisan-houhou ni tuite”
and Shimizu Tetsuro et al. (2012) “Trade Liberalization and Important Sections in Japanese Agriculture”
Nourin Kinyu, December, 20-43.
First, with regard to border-related measures, the agreements stipulated that
nontariff barriers be removed and tariffs implemented in principle and tariffs be
reduced by 15% over six years. Following the enactment of these agreements,
the Japanese nontariff barriers fell and were replaced by tariffs, except in the case
of rice. With regard to rice, instead of tariffication, Japan relented and accepted
minimal access,
24
but eventually accepted the tariffication of nontariff barriers in
1999. Second, with respect to domestic protection, if the government were to
carry out policies that stimulated production and distorted trade, it should reduce
its subsidies by 20% over six years. It was especially important that agreements
were reached that the price-supporting policies relating to increases in production
should be restrained and that the income-supporting policies decoupled from
production should be promoted. Third, an agreement was reached that export
subsidies would be reduced by 36% in terms of monetary base (21% in terms of
quantity base) over a period of six years.
Following the Uruguay Round agreement, the nontariff barriers with regard to
agricultural products were converted to tariffs and the nature of policies relating
to agriculture protection was switched from price supporting to direct payment.
25
Thereafter, the tariffication of border-related measures was undertaken; the next
step was to reduce the tariff rates in free trade negotiations, such as those
involving Free Trade Agreement (FTA)/Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)
and the TPP. However, the reduced tariff rates led to a fall in food prices and
consequently brought down the income of agricultural producers. In Japan, all
agricultural protection measures against such tariff reductions were collectively
brought about in 2005 as anti-management income stability measures (Keiei
Shotoku Antei Taisaku) within the Basic Plan for Food, Agriculture, and Rural
Areas.
Agricultural Agreements between the United States and European Union.
The Doha Development Round was started in November 2001. In the
agricultural negotiations of this round, the agenda items included border-related
measures, domestic protection, and the reduction of export subsidies. However,
there were outstanding conflicts between the countries involved. First, with
regard to border-related measures, while the United States was interested in large
tariff reductions, the European Union and Japan insisted on the status quo or a
gradual tariff reduction. Second, regarding domestic agricultural protection,
while the United States made a point for strengthening the rules of the “green”
policy, the European Union and Japan preferred to treat it flexibly. Third, with
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regard to export subsidies, the United States insisted on their removal, but the
European Union and Japan asserted the need to enforce export rules.
In agricultural negotiations in August 2003, with respect to border-related
measures, a compromise was reached between the United States (large tariff
reduction) and the European Union (gradual tariff reduction).
26
An upper limit
for tariff rates was presented in the compromise. If Japan accepted the
compromise, large tariff reductions would be enforced for items of high tariff
rates, such as rice. A direct payment policy would be needed to compensate
agricultural producers in terms of income as a countermeasure to such large tariff
reduction. However, the Doha Round agreement experienced difficulties, and
during the Cabinet meeting in December 2011, the whole agreement was
indefinitely abandoned. Therefore, in later years, the FTA/EPA supplemented the
stagnant WTO negotiations in many areas worldwide.
FTA/EPA―TPP Negotiations. While engaging in multilateral negotiations
with multiple WTO member countries, Japan pushed forward for FTA/EPA
negotiations in a positive manner. Presently, Japan continues to negotiate with 13
countries and has reached agreements with several of them. In addition, Japan is
continuing to negotiate with five countries.
27
A characteristic of the Japanese EPA is that the tariff abolition rate is low
compared to that of the United States or the European Union. Japan has
exempted the agricultural, forestry, and fisheries sectors―in particular, rice,
wheat, pork, beef, dairy products, and sugar―from tariff abolitions in EPA
negotiations; this has led to a low tariff abolition rate. However, the partner
countries take up the exclusion items in negotiations from the viewpoint of a
“balance of benefits”; the same would be true if Japan were to present
agricultural, forestry, and fisheries products as exclusion items in negotiations.
For example, in the Japan―Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement, Thailand
did not adequately respond to Japan’s request for tariff reductions for automobiles
only because Japan had specified rice as an exclusion item in the negotiations.
3. Agricultural Administration Reforms: From Price Support to Direct Payment
Following the Uruguay Round agreement, the Japanese agricultural protection
policies have largely changed from price-supporting (consumer burden type) to
direct-payment type policies (financial burden or taxpayer burden type).
28
Relaxation of Price Regulations. The Food Control Law, established in
November 1995 largely relaxed the regulations with regard to price and
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distribution of rice; it also opened up a course to introduce the market-oriented
principle into the agricultural sector. Following the Food Control Law, the price
of rice was determined fundamentally by market supply and demand; the price
and distribution of rice were completely liberalized by the revised Food Control
Law in April 2004. However, the rice production regulations remain unchanged
because the supply of rice is managed by production adjustments.
In July 1999, the Food, Agriculture, and Rural Areas Basic Act was
established. This Act was a revision of the old Basic Act established in 1961; it
attached great importance to the role of the market-oriented principle in
agriculture and marked the transformation from price-supporting policies to
management policies. Under the new Basic Act, the Food, Agriculture, and Rural
Areas Basic Plan (1) was enacted in 2000. Behind the serious considerations of
the market-oriented principle as well as policy reforms in the new Basic
Act―from price-supporting policies to management policies―is the influence of
the Uruguay Round agreement.
Keiei Shotoku Antei Taisaku (Anti-management Income Stability
Measure). The deregulation of prices and distribution has allowed the prices of
agricultural products to change flexibly. In the “Management Policy for
Structural Agriculture Reform and Promotion,” announced by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries in August 2001, the construction of a safety
net to mitigate management risk was suggested. For the first time, issues related
to income stabilization measures were being discussed in earnest by the
Ministry.
29
Furthermore, a statement of the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fisheries in August 2003 said that those within the Ministry had discussed the
transition to cross-item management stabilization measures to help lead farm
management within rural agriculture away from the conventional stabilization
measures that had been devised for individual commodities.
In March 2005, the Food, Agriculture, and Rural Areas Basic Plan (2) was
passed in the Cabinet meeting. In that Plan, two purposes were noted for Keiei
Shotoku Antei Taisaku (anti-management income stability measure). First, the
Plan would correct the differences between Japan and foreign countries with
respect to productivity. Second, it would relax the influence that changes in
circulation income would have on farm management. The correction of
productivity difference with foreign countries is made while taking cognizance of
WTO agreements and the FTA/EPA. Such a policy perspective is considered an
important reform in agricultural policy that extends beyond conventional taboos.
30
The anti-management income stability measures are the agricultural policies that
allow for the possibility of tariff reductions for rice. In October 2005, the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries decided upon a “broad outline of
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management stabilization measures” to bring the Basic Plan into operation. The
management stability measures were then enforced in 2007.
The System of Individual (Household) Income Support. In July 2007, the
Democratic Party won the Upper House election. During its election campaign,
the Democratic Party had promised to compensate individual (household) income
among sale farmhouses. The system of individual (household) income support is
the same as the management income stability measures in that it follows a direct
payment policy. This individual income compensation was evaluated as a
measure to promote FTA/EPA negotiations. The Democratic Party again won the
Lower House elections in August 2009, and its government was sworn in.
Thereafter, the system of individual (household) income support for rice was
enforced in 2010.
The mechanism of individual (household) income support compensates the
difference between production costs and selling prices for all sales of farmhouse
rice (i. e., those with a management area exceeding 30 ares, or annual sales
revenue exceeding JPY 500, 000). In the absence of scale limitations, the
individual (household) income support covers all sales of farmhouses
participating in rice production adjustments. Therefore, this measure does not
eliminate the part-time and small-management farmhouses.
Fundamental Reforms of Agricultural Policies. The Abe Administration of
the Liberal Democratic Party initiated fundamental agricultural policy reforms by
taking advantage of the TPP negotiations of 2013. The basic course of the
fundamental reforms is the reinforcement of competitive powers of agriculture,
the abolition of production adjustment of rice, and the foundation of a Japanese
model of the direct payment system.
After the Abe Administration took charge, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries established in January 2013 “the head office promoting
agriculture and forestry marine products industry for attack,” whose division
director was the Minister. The plan of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries for the reinforcement of competitive powers of agriculture included the
following points: reinforcement of production sites (farmland accumulation and a
reduction of the abandonment of cultivation), expansion of demand frontiers
(export expansion of agricultural products), and construction of value chain from
production to consumption (the industrialization of agriculture and development
of an “agriculture and forestry fishery fund for growth industry”).
On November 26, 2013, expecting an agreement in TPP negotiations that
year, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries presented “a reform
course of agricultural administration.”
31
That reform course included abolishing
the price supports in terms of production adjustment of rice and founding a
Japanese model of direct payment system. This model consists of the following
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concrete points: the abolition of production adjustment (acreage reduction), the
abolition of subsidies conditioned by production adjustment, support for changing
the composition of cultivated crops, and foundation of the Japanese model of
direct payment system.
First, production adjustment will be completely abolished after 2018.
32
Production adjustment was carried out from 1970 to date and covers about 40%
of the rice crop area. The production, circulation, and price of rice will be
completely liberalized following the abolition of production adjustment. The
production of rice will increase following the abolition of production adjustment,
and the price of rice will fall. This could improve the international price
competitiveness of rice. In addition, the medium or small farmhouses having
weak competitiveness would be screened by the fall of rice prices, and there
would be the accumulation of farmlands and promotion of large-scale
farmhouses. Farmland accumulation would lead to the reduction of production
costs of rice.
Second, the subsidies for promoting production adjustments will be
abolished.
33
The system of individual income compensation founded under the
Democratic Party Administration will be reduced from 2014 and completely
abolished after 2018. So far, subsidies of JPY 15,000/10 ares were given for the
sales of farmhouses that cooperated with production adjustment (fiscal year 2012:
a total of JPY 1,552 hundred million for 980,000 sale farmhouses). In 2014, this
is reduced to JPY 7,500/10 ares, and the targeted farmhouses are limited to the
admitted and collective farmers. In addition, the subsidies for price fluctuation of
rice would be abolished after 2014.
Third, changing the composition of cultivated crops will be supported.
34
The
increased supply of rice from the abolition of production adjustments may cause
the price of rice to suddenly drop. To get around this issue, the government may
increase the subsidies to change the composition of cultivated crops from rice to
other crops and restrain the supply of rice. The subsidies for supporting rice
production for feed and rice flour will be increased to JPY 105,000/10 ares from
JPY 80,000/10 ares.
Fourth, in 2014, an income compensation policy not related to production
adjustments will be founded as the Japanese model of direct payment system.
35
This direct payment system is an income compensation policy considering
multiple agricultural functions. With respect to farmland maintenance payment,
the assistance is JPY 3,000/10 ares, and as for resources maintenance (landscape
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conservation) payment, the subsidy is JPY 2,400/10 ares. Regarding the direct
payment for intermediate mountainous areas and environmental conservation, the
existing systems will continue.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the international and domestic TPP
negotiations (domestic reforms) by using a two-level game analysis that is a
framework of international political economy. The conclusions of this paper are
summarized as follows.
First, the interests of Japanese international negotiations lie in the market
access of goods, include 21 issues for negotiations, and depend on how far Japan
raises its tariff abolition rates. Japan must raise its tariff abolition rates by more
than 95.9% to forge an international agreement with the United States. In this
case, Japan cannot maintain all tariffs of the five important agricultural product
categories (586 items) that are the sanctuary items.
Second, it is necessary to give side payments (income compensation) through
domestic reforms (agricultural administration reforms) for the domestic
constituencies that incur economic loss to obtain domestic ratification while
entering into international agreements at high rates of tariff abolition. The
agricultural administration reforms that the Abe Administration is going to carry
out with TPP propose to found the Japanese model of direct payment systems
while reinforcing the competitive power of agriculture. The main points of
competitive power reinforcement for agriculture are the abolition of production
adjustment and the promotion of farmland accumulation.
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